NOTE
PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL LIMITATIONS
ON STATE TAXATION OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Unlike the federal government, which can tax the income of its
corporate citizens regardless of source,1 a state is permitted to tax
only that portion of a corporation's income derived from within its
jurisdiction.2 The problem of dividing equitably an interstate corporation's business income among the states in which it operates
has been a topic of long-standing concern to national businesses
fearful of double state taxation.' With the advent of the multinational corporation (MNC),' the apportionment problem has drawn
the attention of the entire international business community.5
To determine what portion of an interstate or multinational corporation's business income is derived from a particular jurisdiction, the states have followed two general approaches: the
separate accounting theory and formulary apportionment.' The
I.R.C. §§ 11, 61(a), 63(a).
2 The commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art.

1, § 8, cl.3, and the due process clause, U.S. CON-

ST. amend. XIV, § 1, permit a state to tax only that income derived from an activity with a

substantial nexus to the taxing state. In addition, the tax must be fairly apportioned, nondiscriminatory, and fairly related to state services. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,
430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
' See generally Hearings on S. 2173 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1977 & 1978); State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Hearings on
State Taxation of Interstate Commerce Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973); Hearings on H.R. 11798 Before the Special Subcomm. on State Taxation of
Interstate Commerce of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
The multinational corporation, a phenomenon of the post-World War II era, has been
defined as "a cluster of corporations of diverse nationality joined together by ties of common ownership and responsive to a common management strategy." Vernon, Economic
Sovereignty at Bay, 47 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 110, 114 (1968). See generally STAFF OF SUBCOMM.
ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 93d CONG., 1ST SESS., THE
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND THE WORLD ECONOMY (Comm. Print 1973); R. VERNON,
SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY (1971).
' See, e.g., State Taxation of Foreign Source Income: Hearings on H. R. 5076 Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 308 (1980) (statement of Joseph
Guttentag of the Dutch Employer's Federation) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
' A third division of income method is specific allocation. States generally apply specific
allocation only to those types of income that can be traced to a single source. For instance,
most states specifically allocate rentals received from real estate to the state in which the
real estate is located. Because income derived from the sales of an integrated manufactur-
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separate accounting theory treats each member of a multicorporate group as a separate and independent entity.7 This method
isolates the income of each corporate group member, disregarding
the performance of the MNC as a whole. Therefore, intercorporate transactions' are viewed as taxable events, just as if the
members were dealing with nonrelated corporations. Due to the
related nature of the group, transfer prices between group
members may not reflect accurately fair market prices. In these
instances, tax authorities must recalculate transfer prices to
reflect actual income.9
The theory underlying formulary apportionment views the
overall success of an MNC as critical. It does not attempt to
isolate the income of each group member, but combines the income of those members that participate in a unitary business and
apportions the total to the various jurisdictions within which the
business operates. 0 First, the tax authority must determine which
ing or mercantile business is not easily traced to a sole source, states generally do not attempt to apply specific allocation to business income. There is a divergence of opinion
among the states regarding what types of income are specifically allocable and what types
are apportionable. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 429 (1980) (Supreme
Court upheld the apportionability of dividend income). Specific allocation also presents double taxation problems. Often more than one state has sufficient nexus to specifically
allocable income to tax that income. To illustrate, both the state of incorporation and the
state of commercial domicile have a sufficient nexus to allocate 100% of a corporation's
dividends to their jurisdiction. See generally Dexter, Taxation of Income from Intangibles
of Multistate-MultinationalCorporations,29 VAND. L. REV. 401 (1976).
' See generally G. ALTMAN & F. KEESLING, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION
(2d ed. 1950); Note, MultinationalCorporationsand Income Allocation under Section 482 of
the Internal Revenue Code, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1202 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Harvard
Note].
Intercorporate transactions include, for example, patent transfers, loans, provision of
management services, and intercorporate dividends.
I.R.C. § 482. The regulations accompanying § 482 authorize four methods for use in
determining an appropriate "arm's length" price for intercorporate transactions. The first
three authorize price setting by reference to similar transactions between nonrelated parties. The fourth permits any other method that is "clearly more appropriate." Treas. Reg. §
1.482-2 (1968). If no comparable third party transaction exists, a situation estimated to occur
more often than not, the I.R.S. relies on the fourth method, which parallels closely formulary apportionment. See HarvardNote, supra note 7, at 1223.
" See generally J. Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State Tax Apportionment and
the Circumscriptionof the Unitary Business, 21 NAT'L TAX J. 487 (1968); Keesling, A Current Look at the Combined Report and Uniformity in Allocation Prices, 42 J. TAX. 106
(1975); Lavelle, What Constitutes a Unitary Business, 1973 So. CAL. TAX INST. 14; Rudolph,
State Taxation of Interstate Business: The Unitary Business Concept and Affiliated Corporate Groups, 25 TAX. L. REV. 171 (1970). Of the forty-five states with corporate income
taxes, twenty-six apply formulary apportionment. Twelve of these apply formulary apportionment to worldwide income. See House Hearings, supra note 5, at 358-59.
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members constitute a unitary business.1 1 The apportionable income of each of these members is then combined and a formula,
designed to reflect the portion of total income attributable to the
taxing state, is applied. Most states use a three-factor formula
based upon the average ratio of state sales to total sales, state
payrolls to total payrolls, and state property values to total property values.12 To illustrate, for an MNC that has one-fourth of its
tangible property, one-half of its payroll, and three-fourths of its
sales located within the taxing state, the average of these three
factors (one-half) is applied to the combined income of the unitary
business to arrive at the state's taxable portion.
Most nations, including the United States, have adopted the separate accounting technique to divide an MNC's worldwide business
income. 3 In the United States, Congress has initiated several attempts over the past fifteen years to bring state taxation of MNC
income into conformity with federal and international standards."
Many controversies arise at this preliminary stage. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin
Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980). See generally J. Hellerstein, supra note 10, and text
accompanying notes 40-46 infra.
formula, some
8 Several states employ less than three factors in their apportionment
states double weight various factors, and definitions of what each factor constitutes vary
from state to state. See STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT (P-H) 1223. The U.S.
Supreme Court recently upheld a state formula incorporating a sole sales factor as a fair apportionment method. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978). But see General
Motors v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553 (1965).
18 See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, MODEL CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL (REVISED
DRAFT) art. 9 (1977), reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 153; ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, MODEL CONVENTION FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL art. 9 (1977), reprinted in 1 TAX
TREATIES (CCH) 151.
" In 1959, the Supreme Court decision of Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v.
Minnesota, 335 U.S. 911 (1959), allowing a state to impose a fairly apportioned income tax
on a nonresident corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce in the state, set
off a series of primarily unsuccessful attempts to limit state taxation of interstate and
foreign commerce. In 1959, Congress enacted a statute that placed minimal requirements
on state taxation of interstate commerce, and which authorized an exhaustive study of statetaxation of interstate commerce. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1976)). The study was completed during 1964 and 1965. SPECIAL
SUBCOMM. ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1964) and H.R. REP. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). The Special Committee
recommended that federal legislation be enacted to increase the uniformity of corporate income taxation systems among the states. H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 593-99
(1964). H.R. 11798, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(2) (1965) incorporated certain of the Special
Subcommittee's recommendations by prohibiting states from including foreign affiliate income in apportionable tax bases. The bill, a broad measure encompassing many more
aspects of state taxation reform than just foreign income taxation, was rewritten and reintroduced as H.R. 16491, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), which in turn was replaced by H.R.
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This Note analyzes Senate Bill 655's (hereinafter S.655), legislation
limiting inclusion of foreign source income in the state tax base
and restricting state taxation of foreign source dividends. In view
of the traditional sovereignty granted states in determining their
own fiscal affairs, this Note examines whether special policy considerations exist which justify federal intervention, and whether
the legislation is tailored to resolve the actual problems raised by
state taxation of MNC income.
II.

STATE TAXATION IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

Framework for Analysis

A.

The authority of the states to raise their own revenues and to
determine their own fiscal policies has been viewed traditionally
as an essential element of the states' separate and independent
role in the United States federal system. 6 As Alexander Hamilton
stated in The Federalist:
[Tihe individual States should possess an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues for the supply
of their wants. . . . [An attempt on the part of the national
government to abridge them in the exercise of it would be a
violent assumption of power unwarranted by any article or
clause of the Constitution. 7

The Supreme Court has recognized repeatedly the authority of
the states to impose taxes on income. 8 In its most recent statement on the relationship between state and federal income taxa2158, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). H.R. 2158 succeeded in the House but failed to pass in the
Senate. See 114 CONG. REC. 14, 432-33 (1968). A similar bill, H.R. 7906, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969) met the same fate. See 115 CONG. REC. 17, 323 (1969). Comparable bills have been
introduced repeatedly, without success. See House Hearings, supra note 5, at 294-95 (statement of John Nolan).
"5S. 655, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). S. 655 is a slightly revised edition of H.R. 5076, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. and S. 1688, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., neither of which received action prior to
the completion of the 96th Congress.
"The power of taxation is indispensible to [the states'] existence, and is a power which,
in its own nature, is capable of residing in, and being exercised by, different authorities, at
the same time." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 198 (1824). See also Allied Stores of
Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526 (1959). For a more complete discussion of the role of
state taxation in the federal system, see W. Hellerstein, State Taxation in the Federal
System: Perspectives on Louisiana's First Use Tax on Natural Gas, 55 TUL. L. REV. 601

(1981).
No. 32 (A. Hamilton).
See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); Allied Stores of Ohio,
Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266
U.S. 271 (1924); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
'

"
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tion powers, the Supreme Court noted that "[cloncurrent federal
and state taxation of income, of course, is a well-established norm.
Absent some explicit directive from Congress, we cannot infer
that treatment of foreign income at the federal level mandates
identical treatment by the States."' 9 As long as the state tax "is
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing
State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the
State,"' it is permissible.
In light of the extensive autonomy exercised by the states in
the area of taxation, and the strong tradition of concurrent state
and federal income taxation, congressional action intruding upon
state taxation authority should be undertaken only when
necessitated by special policy considerations, and in that event only
to the extent necessary to conform to those considerations. Unwarranted legislation or legislation that is more expansive than
necessary to meet special policy considerations is inconsistent
with the United States federal system.
B.

Foreign Commerce Considerations

Proponents of S.655 have asserted several foreign commerce
considerations to justify federal limitations on state taxation of
MNC income.2' Several U.S. Supreme Court decisions provide
guidance in assessing whether foreign commerce concerns should
outweigh the right of states to set their own tax policies.
In the Japan Lines case, the Supreme Court struck down under
commerce clause analysis an ad valorem property tax imposed
upon a foreign corporation's cargo shipping containers. 2 The
foreign corporation had already paid property tax upon the containers in its nation of domicile. Even though the state tax was
fairly apportioned, the Court invalidated it. The Court stressed
the special commerce clause analysis required in issues involving
foreign commerce:
[I]f the containers at issue here were instrumentalities of purely
interstate commerce, Complete Auto would apply and be
satisfied. . . . The premise of appellee's argument is that the
Commerce Clause analysis is identical, regardless of whether inMobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 448 (1980).
" Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
" See House Hearings, supra note 5. at 136 (statement of Sen. Charles Mathias).
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
"
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terstate or foreign commerce is involved. This premise, we have
concluded, must be rejected. When construing Congress' power
to 'regulate Commerce with foreign nations,' a more extensive
constitutional inquiry is required."
Applying this stricter standard, the Court noted that because
property is often taxed in full at the site of its foreign domicile, instrumentalities of foreign commerce are subject to a risk of double taxation, not faced by domestic commerce, in violation of the
commerce clause. ' Under this analysis, evidence indicating that a
higher tax burden might be imposed upon foreign commerce may
be sufficient to invalidate the state tax. Additionally, the Court
noted that "a state tax on the instrumentalities of foreign commerce may impair federal uniformity in an area where federal
uniformity is essential."' The need for federal uniformity is yet
another yardstick with which to measure the permissibility of a
state tax in a foreign commerce setting.
In McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corporation,' the Supreme Court
struck down a state sales tax on imported fuel under a preemption
analysis. In that case, New York City had imposed a sales tax on
fuel manufactured for sale to vessels active in foreign commerce.
Fuel imported for this purpose had been exempted previously
from import duties under a federal regulatory scheme adopted to
place American refiners in a more favorable position vis-a-vis
their foreign competitors. The Court held that the federal scheme
operated as a regulation of foreign commerce, which preempted
the sales tax. "It is evident that the purpose of the Congressional
regulation of the [foreign] commerce would fail if the state were
free . . . to impose a tax which would lessen the competitive
advantage conferred on the importer by Congress ...."I Under
this analysis, the Court examined whether the state tax interfered
with a foreign policy adopted by the federal government.
These decisions ruled upon the constitutionality of the state
taxes involved. Although this Note does not address the constitutionality of the inclusion of foreign source income in a state's apportionable tax base,28 but rather the propriety of federal in" Id. at 445-46.
" Id. at 446-47.
Id. at 448.
309 U.S. 414 (1940).

Id. at 429. For discussion of preemption analysis in a state tax setting, see W. Hellerstein, supra note 16.
U In Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924), the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of applying formulary apportionment to the
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tervention in state taxation issues, the strict discrimination and
federal uniformity inquiries indicated in Japan Lines and the inquiry into state interference with federal foreign commerce
policies undertaken in McGoldrick are, nonetheless, utilized as
helpful reference points in examining the appropriateness of
S.655.
III.

FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT IN AN
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Several states that have adopted the formulary apportionment
method do not stop at the water's edge in determining the combined income, sales, payroll, and property of a unitary business
for tax purposes. 9 That is to say, they require an MNC operating
within their borders to report the income, sales, payroll, and property figures of all foreign affiliates that participate in the MNC's
unitary business3 Many arguments have been asserted against
the extension of the formulary apportionment method to the
worldwide income of a unitary business. Senator Mathias, sponsor
of S.655, remarked that the bill was necessary to resolve the international double taxation resulting from worldwide combination
and to meet the need for federal uniformity." At congressional
hearings on state taxation of foreign source income, several other
arguments were presented, including the assertion that states are
taxing income without a sufficient nexus,32 that the determination
of whether a business is unitary is unreasonable and arbitrary,that the method places substantial administrative burdens upon
domestic and foreign MNCs,1 that the method causes distortion of
income,' and that the method is an international irritant with
worldwide repercussions.'
worldwide income of a unitary business. The Supreme Court has also upheld state taxation
of foreign source dividends. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980). See,
generally W. Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations:'
Reflections on Mobil, Exxon, and H.R. 5076, 79 MICH. L. REV. 113 (1981).

Of the twenty-six states that use formulary apportionment, twelve apply it to the
worldwide income of a unitary business. See House Hearings, supra note 5, at 359.
s' See CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR THE PREPARATION OF
COMBINED REPORTS WHICH INCLUDE FOREIGN COUNTRY OPERATIONS (1979) reprinted in
House Hearings, supra note 5, at 91 [hereinafter cited as CALIFORNIA GUIDELINES].
S, 127 CONG. REC. S1984 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1981).
u See House Hearings, supra note 5, at 145 (statement of Charles Wheeler).
I at 189 (statement of Thomas McHugh).
Id.
I at 7 (statement of Donald Lubick, Asst. Sec'y of Treas.).
Id.
Id. at 192 (statement of Dallas Hurston).
I at 137 (statement of Sen. Charles Mathias).
Id.
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Nexus

A primary argument asserted by opponents of worldwide combination is the absence of a sufficient nexus between the taxing
state and the foreign source income of the unitary business." The
United States Supreme Court has held that a sufficient nexus
does exist by virtue of the unitary nature of the business."' If XYZ
corporation, a unitary business with integrated and interdependent activities, conducts research in State A, manufactures its product in State B, and sells the product in Country C, it is apparent
that the income arising from the sale of the product in Country C
is derived in part from the activities carried on in States A and B.
The formulary apportionment method is applied to worldwide income to ascertain what portion of the income is attributable to
States A and B. The activities carried on by the unitary business
in those states provide the necessary nexus between the states
and the income produced in Country C.
B.

Definition of Unitary

Opponents of worldwide combination have identified the problems surrounding the threshold question of whether a business is
unitary as support for congressional action restricting application
of formulary apportionment to worldwide income.' The states
have developed two general tests to determine whether a
business is unitary: one based on "the three unities""u and the
other based on "interdependence of the basic operating activities
of the enterprise."" Both tests lack definite standards and place a
power of discretion in the hands of tax authorities, who tend to
classify a business as separate or unitary, depending upon which
category will maximize state revenues.' 2 Resulting classifications

Id. at 145 (statement of Charles Wheeler).
" Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271, 282 (1924).
" See House Hearings, supra note 5, at 189 (statement of Thomas McHugh).
0 The three unities include unity of ownership, unity of operation, and unity of use.
Superior Oil Co. v. Franchise Tax Board, 60 Cal. 2d 406, 34 Cal. Rptr. 545, 386 P.2d 33
(1963).
" See J. Hellerstein, supra note 10, at 501. One author has suggested that there is no
such thing as a nonunitary business. See Keesling, supra note 10, at 109.
"2See House Hearings,supra note 5, at 183 (statement of James McGrath). Corporations,
also, may tend to categorize themselves as unitary or separate depending upon tax consequences. For example, in unrelated hearings an Exxon official stated: "The petroleum industry is unitary in nature. [Accounting] breakdowns require many allocations and assumptions which could lead to erroneous comparisons of data between various companies and
hence erroneous conclusions." The Petroleum Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
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have led to substantial litigation."3 Multinational corporations are
subject to inconsistent classifications among states and inconsistent classifications in the same state from year to year." This
treatment requires MNCs to prepare records for tax purposes
that satisfy both classifications, and the litigation arising over
classifications imposes substantial costs and time delays on
MNCs.
Arbitrary classification as unitary is indeed a problem
associated with worldwide combination. However, because such
classification is a problem faced by wholly intrastate and national
corporations as well as MNCs, it does not discriminate against
foreign commerce and does not in itself merit abandonment of
worldwide combination. A better solution rests in the issuance of
concrete guidelines for classification and a requirement of interstate and intrastate consistency.' 5 Failing state agreement on
appropriate guidelines, classification is a proper subject for
federal legislation.
C.

Administrative Impact

States applying formulary apportionment to worldwide income
require an MNC to prepare a worldwide combined report consisting of the income, property values, sales, and payrolls of the
MNC's in-state operations as well as similar figures for each group
member that has been identified as a part of a unitary business."
Multinational corporations assert that these informational requests impose undue administrative burdens upon them which are
not borne by totally intrastate or national corporations, 7 and that
for this reason federal restraints should be enacted.
The administrative burdens asserted by MNCs are a result of
many factors. In the first instance, the MNCs claim that they
usually do not keep the type of information required by the combined report, and that therefore they incur great costs in creating
and maintaining appropriate records for the sole purpose of filling
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1817
(1975). However, in Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980), Exxon
unsuccessfully attempted to be treated for tax purposes as a group of separate, nonunitary
corporations operating along functional lines.
" See House Hearings,supra note 5, at 191-92 (statement of Thomas McHugh).
"Id.
" S.655 fails to address this critical issue of classification.
" See generally CALIFORNIA GUIDELINES, suPrra note 30.
"' See House Hearings, supra note 5, at 309 (statement of Joseph Guttentag).
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out the combined report. The argument is weak. Such records are
commonly kept for internal management purposes as well as for
financial reporting purposes," and for other tax purposes. For example, MNCs maintain records of property values by region for
property taxes imposed around the world. Little credence should
be afforded the argument that the information requested is not
available and that substantial costs are incurred in their creation.
A much more credible argument pertains to the requirement
that records be kept in accordance with United States accounting
principles.49 Multinational corporations located in foreign countries naturally will operate under that country's accepted accounting principles, and therefore will keep records in accordance with
those principles. The state requirement that the combined report
data be readjusted to reflect United States principles imposes additional administrative burdens on foreign MNCs, which would
not ordinarily make such readjustments. The burdens can be
onerous. For example, property that has been depreciated at a
faster rate than is acceptable under United States principles must
be revalued. To readjust values, each piece of property must be
identified, original cost reconstructed, useful life assigned, salvage
value determined, and an eligible depreciation method chosen and
applied.' Current deductions taken for capital expenditures must
be capitalized." Inventories,' as well as valuation of assets and
liabilities, must be accounted for according to United States principles.4
These readjustment requirements, without doubt, place a heavy
burden on foreign MNCs that would otherwise not make such
readjustments. Domestic MNCs, however, cannot assert the same
claim, as they must make such readjustments in any instance for
federal tax purposes' and for financial reporting purposes.
Worldwide combination imposes no additional administrative
burdens upon them.
Another undue administrative burden asserted by both United
States and foreign MNCs is the need to translate the income,
payroll, sales, and property values of their foreign affiliates into
See generally HANDBOOK OF MODERN ACCOUNTING (S. Davidson ed. 1970).
" See generally CALIFORNIA GUIDELINES, supra note 30.
"

50See House Hearings,supra note 5, at 170 (statement of Paul Cook).
" Id.
at 241 (statement of Valentine Brooks).
'
53

See generally CALIFORNIA
Id.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 167.

GUIDELINES,

supra note 30.
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United States dollars.' The argument loses its strength in view of
the fact that every MNC must express its foreign affiliates' accounts into the currency of its parent corporation for purposes of
financial reports and national taxation.' Therefore, state requests
for this information are not an additional burden, unless they require the MNC to adopt currency translation methods not usually
employed or require more information than is usually provided to
the parent corporation. If, for instance, the state requires a
foreign MNC to translate its affiliates' worldwide accounts into
United States dollars when the affiliate accounts ordinarily would
be translated into British sterling, an additional burden is imposed on the foreign MNC not faced by domestic MNCs, which
ordinarily translate their worldwide accounts into United States
dollars.
Foreign MNCs also have shown that information requested by
the worldwide combined report may not be subject to disclosure
under foreign laws. For example, if a foreign affiliate is engaged
in highly confidential defense work with a foreign country, its
records will be restricted information.57
States have no jurisdiction to compel a production or an audit of
the records of a foreign MNC. The state often attempts to coerce
production from the parent by imposing penalties on the affiliate
operating within its jurisdiction.' If the information is still not
forthcoming, the state extrapolates from the foreign MNC's annual report or other public financial records to calculate taxable
income. This often leads to higher taxation, since annual reports
are designed to paint a more favorable picture of the foreign MNC
59
than would be indicated in a tax return.
From these facts it appears that data requirements associated
with worldwide combination impose a higher administrative
burden on foreign MNCs than the burden faced by domestic
MNCs or wholly intrastate or national businesses. Referring to
Japan Line's strict inquiry into discriminatory taxation burdens
on foreign commerce, it would not be inappropriate for Congress
to eliminate this discriminatory impact by prohibiting state ap"The required conversion of financial figures to dollars at scores of different rates of
exchange with sharp fluctuations, devaluations, and other changes, is an operational
nightmare." House Hearings, supra note 5, at 226 (statement of Kirby Scott).
" See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-1 (1967).
", See House Hearings, supra note 5, at 228 (statement of Kirby Scott).
"Id.
, Levine, Implications of Article 9(4) of the United Kingdom Tax Treaty for State Tax
Purposes, 11 URB. LAW. 284, 303-04 (1979).
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plication of formulary apportionment to the foreign source income
of foreign MNCs." However, S.655 does not limit its restrictions
to foreign MNCs. 1 The foreign source income of domestic MNCs
is also excluded from apportionable state tax bases. Such
legislative overextension is not justified and should be withdrawn.
The fact that worldwide combination imposes some administrative burdens on domestic MNCs is insufficient justification for federal legislation prohibiting its use. Administrative
burdens cannot be viewed in a vacuum. First, additional administrative burdens are an inherent aspect of operating an MNC.
Variances in language, currencies, and accounting principles
naturally will cause a domestic MNC to face higher administrative
burdens than a small intrastate business, regardless of what kind
of taxation method is used. Second, the recordkeeping requirements imposed by the separate accounting technique are
arguably as complex and burdensome as those required by
worldwide combination. 2 Finally, the administrative abilities of
state tax authorities must be considered in deciding whether
worldwide combination should be prohibited in regard to domestic
MNCs. A special congressional committee has found that the
separate accounting approach "already produces significant problems when applied at the federal level and would be virtually impossible to administer at the State level."'
Administrative
burdens of compliance must be balanced against the administrative burdens of enforcement. Bearing in mind that
worldwide combination does not impose discriminatory administrative burdens on domestic MNCs as it does on foreign
60California, the state which has suffered the most criticism for its application of formulary apportionment to the worldwide income of a unitary business, has introduced a bill
that would prohibit state tax authorities from including the foreign source income of a
foreign MNC in the state's apportionable tax base. California Assembly Bill No. 55, 1981-82
Session.
' Proposed § 7518(a) provides that:
(a) In General-Where two or more corporations are members of the same affiliated group of corporations-(1) for purposes of imposing an income tax on any
corporation which is a member of such group, no State, or political subdivision
thereof, may take into account, or include in income subject to such tax, any
amount of income of, or attributable to,
(2) any other corporation which is a member of such group and which is a foreign
corporation....
S.655, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
02 See I.R.C. §§ 861(b), 862(b); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.861-8; 1.862-1(b) (1960), 1.863-5(c) to 6 (1960);
T.D. 7456 (Jan. 3, 1977); see Feinschreiber, FinalRegulationsfor Allocating and Apportioning Deductions, 3 INT'L TAX J. 278 (1977).
HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON FOREIGN
SOURCE INCOME,

95th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1977).
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MNCs, and in view of the documented and numerous difficulties
that would be placed upon the states if forced to adopt the
separate accounting approach with regard to the foreign source
income of domestic MNCs, the assertion of undue administrative
burdens on the part of domestic MNCs does not justify abandonment of worldwide combination with regard to domestic MNCs.
D. Distortion of Income
Worldwide combination is based on the assumption that
regardless of location, a dollar of property, payroll, and sales will
result in the same rate of return." Although this assumption may
be valid in a homogeneous economy, when extended on a
worldwide basis, which covers a wide spectrum of economic conditions, it loses its applicability. It may require twice the payroll,
twice the sales, and three times the property values to produce a
dollar of income in the United States as opposed to other regions
of the world.5 The result is unfair apportionment.'
No evidence of distortion of income has been offered by MNCs
which assert this argument. Until proven, it should not be considered sufficient to justify federal restraints. In addition, if
distortion is shown to occur by application of formulary apportionment to worldwide income, states should be given the opportunity
to devise formulae that will take account of the variances in production levels. Until distortion of income has been shown factually
and proven to be incorrectable by formula changes, this argument
should not be used to justify federal limitations on worldwide combination.
E.

Double Taxation

The argument most frequently asserted against worldwide combination is that it results in double international taxation. 7 The
argument is disturbingly lacking in analytical content. Its use
represents a grave misunderstanding of the notion of double taxation and how it applies in a context where two levels of taxing
authority are present.
House Hearings, supra note 5, at 167 (statement of Paul Cook).
Id. at 194 (statement of Dallas Hurston).
In addition, there are variances in factor definitions. For instance, the U.S. definition of
payroll may not include benefits conferred by a foreign MNC, which are included in another
country's definition of payroll.
Id. at 136 (statement of Sen. Charles Mathias).
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Theoretically, double taxation of income at a state level cannot
occur because states can tax only that income derived from within
their jurisdiction." In practice, however, double taxation among
states can result due to the nonuniformity of apportionment
methods applied. 9 Double taxation can easily occur at a federal
level, since the United States and most other nations can tax
100% of their citizens' income, regardless of source.7 0 For this
reason, nations enter into tax treaties that generally cede primary
taxing authority to the nation in which income is derived.7 1 The
purpose of these treaties is to eliminate double taxation at a national level. In the absence of treaties, most nations grant their
citizens a limited tax credit for foreign taxes paid to eliminate
double taxation at a national level. 2
Double taxation is an inappropriate term when discussing concurrent federal and state taxation of income. As noted earlier,
simultaneous taxation of income by state and federal governments
is a recognized and accepted norm. The concept does not change
when a foreign national government is substituted. State taxation
is separate and independent from national taxation, regardless of
the nation involved, and is permissible as long as constitutional requirements of substantial nexus, fair apportionment, nondiscrimination, and fair relation are met. The double taxation
argument is not applied properly in this context of concurrent taxation. The proposition does not justify federal limitations on state
application of formulary apportionment to worldwide income.
F.

Foreign Commerce

A very important issue raised in the controversy surrounding
S.655 is whether the federal government's international tax policy
should be determinative of the states' rights to tax foreign commerce. Ordinarily, a choice by the federal government to tax income in a certain way does not bind the states. To illustrate, the
states are not bound to allow deductions for state income taxes
See note 2 supra; see W. Hellerstein, supra note 28.
" For a survey of the various apportionment formulae applied by the states, see STATE
AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT (P-H) 1223. As discussed in note 6 supra, double taxation of nonbusiness income can also occur.
70 I.R.C. §§ 11, 61(a), 63(a).
71 See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains art. 7, Mar. 25, 1980,
United Kingdom-United States, U.S.T. __,
T.I.A.S. No. 9580, reprinted in 2 TAX
TREATIES (CCH)
8103A [hereinafter cited as U.K.-U.S. Tax Treaty].
See I.R.C. §§ 33, 642, 841, 874, 901, 931.
6
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paid simply because the federal government permits such a deduction.73 States often tax a different income base than the federal
government has chosen to tax. Under this analysis, it cannot be inferred that "treatment of foreign income at the federal level mandates identical treatment by the States."
As discussed earlier, in McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corporation"
the Supreme Court considered whether a state tax interfered
with a prior legislative scheme adopted by Congress to regulate
foreign commerce. Although the McGoldrick case is
distinguishable from the present controversy because of the total
absence of any federal tax imposed on the imported fuel, it
nonetheless provides a useful standard of analysis in examining
whether congressional limitations on state application of
worldwide combination are appropriate.
The purpose of the federal government in entering tax treaties
that incorporate the separate accounting theory is to avoid double
taxation at a national level. Strongly influenced by the United
States practice, numerous other nations have joined the United
States in an effort to eliminat - double taxation among nations."
State application of formulary apportionment to the worldwide income of MNCs has confused and angered the governments that
represent foreign MNCs operating within the states.7 7 These
governments have attempted to protect the interests of these
MNCs through their negotiations with the United States federal
government. This has resulted in substantial interference with
the United States federal government's plan to eliminate double
taxation at a national level through bilateral tax treaties. It also
has become a source of international irritation for the United
States government. 8
For example, at the behest of the British government, the
United States included a provision in the proposed U.K.- U.S. tax
treaty that restricted state application of formulary apportion-

" See I.R.C. § 164.
"' Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 448 (1980).
309 U.S. 414 (1940).
"' See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,

MODEL CON-

VENTION FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND
CAPITAL art. 9 (1977), reprintedin 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1 151.

"' See, e.g., House Hearings,supra note 5, at 308 (statement of Joseph Guttentag).
"' See, e.g., letter from Paola Pansa Cedronio, Ambassador of Italy, on behalf of the
European Economic Communities, to the Department of State (Mar, 19, 1980), reprinted in
House Hearings, supra note 5, at 359-60.
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ment to worldwide income.7 9 Immediately, state tax authorities objected. The Senate gave advice and consent to ratification of the
treaty with a reservation stipulating that the provision restricting
state taxation be deleted.' Extensive hearings on the proposed
treaty were held, in large part focusing on the state limitation provisions. 1 The treaty was approved by the Senate four and one-half
years after its original signing, with the provision limiting state
taxation deleted. A few months later the British House of Commons approved the revised treaty, but only when assured that the
United States Congress would limit state usage of worldwide combination through legislation.' Upon final execution of the treaty,
the British Ambassador expressed his government's grave concern that the treaty failed to limit state usage of worldwide combination:
Her Majesty's Government has recognized . . . the difficult
issues raised within the United States in seeking to limit State
taxing powers through the double taxation conventions of the
United States .... It must be emphasized however that the acceptance of the Senate reservation in no way implies approval of
the unitary basis and it is the urgent request of Her Majesty's
Government . . . that the Government of the United States
should use its best endeavours to eliminate the international application of the unitary basis of taxation.8
State application of formulary apportionment to the worldwide income of a unitary business was a principal cause of a five year
delay in ratifying the U.K.-U.S. tax treaty. The delay constituted a substantial interference with federal attempts to
negotiate a double taxation treaty in pursuance of its policy decision to eliminate double taxation at a national level.

" Proposed Convention Between the United States and the United Kingdom for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes
on Income and Capital Gains art. 9(4), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
" Protocol to the Convention Between the Government of the United States and the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes
on Income and Capital Gains, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 2 TAx TREATIES
(CCH) I 8103DA.
81 Treaties with the United Kingdom, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines:Hearings Before the Senate Comm on ForeignRelations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
u See letter from Sir Nicholas Henderson, Ambassador of the United Kingdom, to the
United States Government (Mar. 25, 1980), reprintedin part in House Hearings,supra note
5, at 290-92.
a Id.
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In 1973, the government of the Netherlands" prepared to
negotiate a new tax treaty with the United States, but delayed in
anticipation of the U.K.-U.S. tax treaty results." When it
became apparent that the states were not going to be limited by
the U.K.-U.S. tax treaty (and impliedly by no other future tax
treaties), the Netherlands approached the United States Department of State with complaints on behalf of Dutch corporations in
California." The Netherlands took the position that state application of formulary apportionment to the worldwide income of a
unitary business violates the non-discrimination clause of the
Netherlands friendship agreement with the United States. 7
In an exchange of notes accompanying a recent protocol to the
tax treaty with France, France indicated its disapproval of the
state usage of worldwide combination." However, no provision
regarding state taxation was incorporated into the protocol due to
the lack of success of the U.K. -U.S. tax treaty provision. Instead,
France, along with the other EEC Member States, expressed its
reliance on Congress to resolve the problem.."
This evidence supports a conclusion that state application of the
formulary apportionment method to the worldwide income of a
foreign MNC interferes with the federal government's stated
policy of eliminating double taxation at the national level through
bilateral tax treaties. In addition, the practice has caused tension
and friction between the United States and other nations of the
world, as well as a fear of retaliation. ' For these reasons, federal
legislation restricting inclusion of the foreign source income of
foreign MNC's in the states' apportionable tax base is justified.
However, there is no such justification for the additional prohibition against inclusion of the foreign source income of domestic
MNCs in a state's apportionable tax base. Foreign governments
are not interested in protecting the interests of United States

" The Netherlands accounted for $9.8 billion of the $40.9 billion invested in the United
States by foreign investors at the end of 1978. Id. at 311.
85 Id.
86Id.

" See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Mar. 27, 1956, United StatesNetherlands, 8 U.S.T. 2043.
" JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., 2d SEss., DESCRIPTION OF S. 983 AND S.
1688 RELATING TO STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE BUSINESS AND FOREIGN SOURCE CORPORATE INCOME 18 (Comm. Print 1980).
" See letter from Paola Pansa Cedronio, Ambassador of Italy, on Behalf of the European
Economic Communities, supra note 78.
" House Hearings, supra note 5, at 136-37.
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MNCs, and continued application of worldwide combination to
United States MNCs will have no effect on United States international tax policy or international relations. Therefore, the legislation should be rewritten so as to apply only to the foreign source
income of foreign MNCs.
IV.

STATE TAXATION OF FOREIGN SOURCE DIVIDENDS

The second restriction incorporated into S.655 limits state taxation of foreign source dividends by permitting the state to tax
dividends derived from foreign sources only to the extent that
they are taxed under federal law. 91 Two regimes govern taxation
of dividends under federal tax law, depending primarily upon the
payor corporation's status as domestic or foreign. The aim of both
schemes is to prevent double corporate taxation at the federal
level.
Federal tax law permits a corporation to deduct eighty-five percent or 1000/o of dividends received from other corporations to the
extent the dividends represent income that has been taxed
previously." In the absence of a dividends-received deduction,

dividends would face double corporate taxation: once as earnings
of the payor corporation and again when distributed to the payee
corporation. S.655 adopts the dividends-received scheme and permits a state to tax dividends received from domestic corporations
deriving less than twenty percent of their income from United
States sources only to the extent allowed under federal law.93
Dividends paid by a foreign corporation out of foreign source
earnings are not eligible for the federal dividends-received deduction, as the underlying foreign income is not subject to prior
" S. 655, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § a (1981) (new I.R.C. § 7518(e)). All but seven of the fortyfive states with a corporate income tax tax foreign dividend income. House Hearings, supra
note 5, at 359. Historically, states have treated dividend income as specifically allocable
rather than apportionable. See Dexter, supra note 6. For example, under the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA), promulgated by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1957, dividend income is subject to specific allocation.
UDITPA is reproduced in STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT (P-H)

91,409-A.

However, several states have begun to treat dividend income as apportionable. See Dexter,
supra note 6. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980), the Supreme Court
upheld the inclusion of foreign dividends from a foreign affiliate, which participated in a
unitary business with the taxpayer in the taxpayer's apportionable tax base. The Court
noted that where the business activities of the dividend payor are not part of the payee's
unitary business activities, due process might prohibit such inclusion. Id. at 442.
9 I.R.C. §§ 243-47, 882. Filing of a consolidated return under I.R.C. §§ 1501-1505 leads to
a similar result.
"S. 655, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § a (1981) (new I.R.C. § 7518(e)(1)(A)).
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federal tax. However, the underlying foreign income generally is
taxable by the government of the nation in which it is earned. To
prevent international double taxation, domestic corporations
receiving a dividend from a foreign corporation in which they
have a ten percent or higher ownership interest are permitted to
claim a foreign tax credit to the extent the foreign corporation has
paid foreign taxes on the underlying income." Accordingly, S.655
prohibits a state from including in the apportionable tax base of a
payee corporation foreign source dividends to the extent their
underlying earnings have been subject to foreign tax.9 5
Since the states treat dividends received from domestic corporations in a variety of ways, it is difficult to ascertain the impact of the imposition of the federal dividends-received deduction
as regards foreign source dividends received from domestic corporations." The implications arising from the restrictions on state
taxation of foreign source dividends received from foreign corporations are much more important. As most foreign nations impose a tax of at least 46% on the dividends' underlying earnings,
the legislation will exclude the major portion of foreign source
dividends paid by foreign corporations from the payee's apportionable tax base. The result will be a substantial decrease in
state revenues. 7 In addition, the limitation provides much more
favorable tax treatment to foreign source dividends than
dividends paid by totally interstate or intrastate corporations,
which continue to bear concurrent federal and state taxation. 8
The few proponents" of the dividend restrictions embodied in
I.R.C. § 902.
" S. 655, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § a (1981) (new I.R.C. § 7518(e)(1)(B)). If underlying foreign
earnings have borne foreign taxes at a rate of 46% or higher, the dividends would be excluded totally from the state tax base. For those dividends whose underlying foreign earnings have borne tax at a rate less than 46/o, a complex formula allows a portion of the dividend representing the excess of the federal tax rate over the foreign tax rate to be included
in the state tax base.
" See W. Hellerstein, supra note 28, at 162-71.
97 Id.
" See House Hearings, supra note 5, at 9 (statement of Donald Lubick, Asst. Sec'y of
Treas.).
" The dividends restrictions have received much less support than restriction of formulary apportionment. Domestic MNCs appear to be the only proponents of the dividend
limitations. See, e.g., id. at 145. The U.S. Department of Treasury specifically disapproved
of the dividend limitations. Id. at 9. Foreign MNCs were much less enthusiastic over the
dividend limitations than over formulary apportionment. See, e.g., id. at 285 (statement of
John Nolan). See also State Taxation of Interstate Commerce and Worldwide CorporateIncome: Hearings on S. 983 and S. 1688 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Hearings].
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S.655 urge that such provisions are necessary (1) to eliminate international double taxation,"° (2) to ensure federal uniformity in
an area in which it is necessary, 1 ' and (3) because the states lack
sufficient nexus to tax foreign source dividends.'"
Automatic application of a federal formula designed to prevent
double taxation at a national level to the states is theoretically unsustainable. As noted earlier, double taxation at a national level is
an entirely different problem than double taxation at a state level,
and neither are synonymous with concurrent federal and state
taxation.'0 Dividend income, like operating income, is usually subject to both federal and state taxation."° Exclusion of foreign
source dividends from state tax bases on the rationale that they
have already borne a foreign tax in place of the United States
federal tax is an inexcusable disruption of the well-established
norm of concurrent state and federal taxation of income.
The asserted need for federal uniformity in the taxation of
foreign source dividends is unfounded. Unlike state application of
formulary apportionment to the worldwide income of a foreign
MNC, state inclusion of foreign source dividends in the payee corporation's tax base does not interfere with federal international
tax policy. 15 Nor does state taxation of foreign source dividends
cause international tension and friction."'
Finally, the United States Supreme Court recently has
acknowledged that state taxation of foreign source dividends does
meet constitutional nexus requirements. 10 This is not to say that
problems surrounding state taxation of dividends are nonexistent.
Differing opinions among states as to whether dividend income
should be apportioned or specifically allocated present a real
threat of double taxation of dividend income at the state level. Additionally, inclusion of foreign source dividends in a state's appor-

See House Hearings, supra note 5, at 150 (statement of Charles Wheeler).
Id. at 156 (statement of Ernest Christian).
102 Id. at 150 (statement of Charles Wheeler).
10 See text accompanying notes 68-73 supra.
10

101

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
10 For instance, state taxation of foreign source dividends played no role in the delay of
the U.K.-U.S. Tax Treaty. See House Hearings, supra note 5, at 287-92 (statement of John
Nolan).
106 Throughout the hearings, foreign MNCs raised no complaints regarding state taxation
of foreign source dividends. See generally House Hearings, supra note 5; Senate Hearings,
supra note 99.
"0 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980). See W. Hellerstein, supra
note 28, at 166.
"0
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tionable tax base without corresponding adjustments in the apportionment formula to reflect related sales, property, and payroll
factors may result in unfair apportionment. However, the answer
to these problems is not the total exclusion of dividends from
state tax bases, but rather legislative guidelines that resolve
these issues.
V.

CONCLUSION

The rights of states to determine their own fiscal policies play
an essential role in the United States federal system. Congressional intervention in this area of state sovereignty should be
undertaken only when necessitated by special federal policy considerations. The heavier administrative burden imposed upon
foreign MNCs by state application of the formulary apportionment method to the worldwide income of a unitary business and
the resulting interference in federal attempts to eliminate double
taxation at an international level are sufficiently compelling policy
considerations to justify federal legislation that prohibits the
states from applying formulary apportionment to the foreign
source income of foreign MNCs. It would be inconsistent with the
federal system to enact legislation that goes beyond what is
necessary to resolve these special policy considerations.
Therefore, the, legislation should not prohibit state application of
formulary apportionment to the foreign source income of domestic
MNCs, and should not restrict state taxation of foreign source
dividends.

Kristen Gustafson

